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An Economist in Government:
Views of a Presidential Advisor

by Murray L. Weidenbaum
As the old saw put it, "Economics is what
economists do." Judging by both my personal experience and observation of the
work of others, I would state that the quotation also accurately describes the role of
economists in government. But, since I am
cognizant of the great variation possible in
the role-and of the numerous factors determining that variation- I am content merely
to describe the role of one economist during
one tour in Washington.
Based on my service as Chairman of the
President's Council of Economic Advisers
from January 1981 to August 1982, I would
conclude that the role varies substantially
over time and that it is a changing blend of
participation in policymaking and preaching
of economic doctrine, both within the government and to the public.
It would be pleasant to report that those
who disagreed with me were generally
wrong and, if pressed, I might be willing to
provide some factual buttressing for that
position. Nevertheless, self-serving statements would not be helpful to the reader.
Instead, I have tried-albeit likely not with
total success-to avoid writing the modern
day equivalent of "An Impartial History of
the Civil War as Reported by John
Tecumseh Sherman."

Dr. Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and Director of the Center for the Study
of American Business at Washington University in
St. Louis.

I attempt to concentrate on the process by
which an official economist participates in
the policymaking process. Moreover, I write
this with the clear knowledge that few if any
decisions in government policy-be they
labeled economic or social or foreign affairs-are made solely or even primarily on

I have tried to avoid writing the modern day
equivalent of "An Impartial History of the
Civil War as Reported by
John Tecumseh Sherman"
the basis of economic analysis or information from economists. Yet I also came away
with the knowledge that most questions of
governmental policymaking-especially
those labeled "non-economic" -do contain
important economic influences.

Bureau in the 1950s it was perhaps inevitable that I played the bad cop. But that
function was destined to remain with the
CEA chairman in many subsequent connections. Surely, I came to advocate rather consistently much larger budget cuts than those
approved.
The economic "White Paper" of February
18, 1981, entitled A Program for Economic
Recovery, constituted a landmark in the
development of President Reagan's
economic program. That document announced the four pillars of the programtax cuts, budget cuts, regulatory relief, and
monetary restraint. It also contained the
economic assumptions underlying the
revenue and expenditure estimates.

Few if any decisions in government policy
are made solely or even primarily 011 the
basis of ec01wmic analysis or information
from economists

Developing the Economic Program
At the outset of the Reagan Administration, for example, the major role of the CEA
Chairman was to participate in the development of the President's Economic Recovery
Program. The initial tax program had been
set during the 1980 campaign: across-theboard personal income tax rate reductions
plus liberalization of business depreciation
allowances. Thus, the emphasis was on
developing the initial package of budget
cuts. My appointment to the three-man
Budget Working Group chaired by Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Director
David Stockman meant that a major part of
my time and effort was devoted to reviewing
proposed expenditure reductions and to
convincing the department heads to go
along with them. One Cabinet secretary was
quoted as saying that Stockman and I constituted a "good cop-bad cop" routine. As
someone who grew up in the old Budget

As the person who took on the responsibility for the White Paper, I instantly
found myself in pitched battles with both
supply-siders and monetarists. Without
repeating all the doctrinal disputes that occurred, I still vividly recall the fervor of
those arguments, which at times bordered
on the theological. In any event, I understood the role of the Chairman of the CEA
not as a means of preaching supply-side
economics or monetarism, but rather of
helping the President develop and carry out
his economic program. Thus, my insistence
that a modest period of recession would
accompany the imposition of monetary restraint was viewed by the supply-siders as a
lack of faith in the instantaneous nature of
the economy's response to the tax cuts. Similarly, my unwillingness to include, for the
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guidance of the Federal Reserve System, a
set of specific annual targets for monetary
growth left the monetarists dismayed.
I understood the role of CEA Chairman not
as a means of preaching supply-side
ecmwmics or monetarism, but rather of
helping the President develop and carry out
his economic program
During this period, I felt a kinship with
Lewis Carroll's Alice. In Through the Looking Glass, Alice says, "There's no use trying,
we can't believe impossible things." "I daresay you haven't had much practice," replies
the Queen. "When I was your age, I always
did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast."
Selling the Economic Program
After the release of the White Paper, the
CEA chairman became one of the three major "salesmen" (along with Treasury
Secretary Donald Regan, and the OMB
Director) for the President's economic program-aside from the "number one communicator" himself. There followed an
almost endless array of joint and individual
congressional testimonies and press conferences; White House briefings to the
Cabinet, other officials, and numerous
visiting interest groups; and speeches,
speeches, speeches to all sorts of organizations-business, consumers, agriculture,
ethnic, regional, religious, etc.
I reached a point that when I was out for
a meal and the waiters began to clear the
dishes, I automatically got ready to stand up
and speak. At first I referred to the speechifying as economic education and then marketing. Subsequently, however, I found my-
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self using the term "forensic economics" to
describe the activity. I was defending the
product that I had helped to design, including the inevitable compromises that anyone
would reluctantly agree to.
I reached a point that whe11 I was out for a
meal and the waiters bega11 to clear the
dishes, I automatically got ready
to stand up a11d speak
In addition, since there is an important international dimension to economic policy, a
wide array of ambassadors and economic
and finance ministers from other nations
frequently came by for discussions ranging
from the courtesy call to the substanti~e. As
chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Economic Policy Committee of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, I carried at times a significant representational load for what was a rather controversial set of policies. As chairman of the
Economic Policy Committee, I had key opportunities to work with my counterparts in
other nations to develop positions and draft
communiques with which we felt comfortable and which other nations would accept.
Informally, the EPC chairmanship enabled
me at key points to unruffle the feathers of
foreign representatives who had been upset
by earlier, "harder line" American presentations.
I did not see my public role as a11 ecmwmic
"oracle" aloof from the foibles of anJ' si1ti11g
administration There is no shortage of that
type of expertise in the private sector
I must admit that I felt no reluctance to
play the public role the President assigned
to me-to serve as a senior representative
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of his Administration at a time when the approval of his economic program by the Congress was an essential step in converting
economic ideas to economic reality. Thus, I
did not see my public role as an economic
"oracle" aloof from the foibles of any sitting
administration. After all, there is no shortage of that type of expertise in the private
sector.

The Day-to-Day Routine
Simultaneously, the development of a host
of detailed government programs and policies was taking place inside the Administration. An important structural change was
the institution of Cabinet Councils toreplace the host of interagency committees
that typically had been organized by the
White House in the past. The CEA chairman
is an active member of three of those cabinet-level groups-Economic Affairs, Commerce and Trade, and Natural Resources
and Environment-and attends the meetings of the other councils (Human Resources,
Food and Agriculture, Legal Policy).
Members of the CEA and its senior staff
serve on the various working groups and
task forces.
The CEA was expected to, and predictably
did, oppose each and every proposal to subsidize some segment of the ec0110my, or to
shield a specific industry from competition
The effectiveness of the CEA on any specific issue discussed by these groups depends
in part on the cogency of its analysis. But
that is not always the case. For example, we
won the battle to eliminate import restrictions on shoes, but lost the struggle to contain restrictions on imports of textiles. Was
it coincidental that the Congressional dele-

6

gation to the White House urging textile
quotas was led by a senior southern Republican who was diligently working for the enactment of the President's program, while
the shoe delegation was chaired by a prominent Northeastern liberal Democrat?
The Cabinet Council system ensures that
the CEA is represented in the decision making apparatus that handles a host of issuessocial security, foreign trade, regulation of
financial institutions, transportation, environment, energy, agriculture, etc. At key
points, the President attends a Cabinet
Council meeting and, at times, makes a decision on the spot. In this regard, the key role
of the CEA was not to develop additional,
brave new programs, but to operate a damage limitation mechanism. Thus, the CEA (at
least in my time) was expected to, and predictably did, oppose each and every proposal to subsidize some segment of the economy, or to shield a specific industry from
competition. At times, a Cabinet member
proposing some additional form of government intervention in the economy would
start off by saying, "Mr. President, Murray
will probably give you a different view,
but. .. "

We did not win all the protectionist
battles, but each and every propo11ent of
additional government involveme11t in the
private sector k11ew that he or she
would have to do battle
In the case of protectionism, we did not
win all the battles, but each proponent of
additional governmental involvement in the
private sector knew that he or she would
have to do battle. In certain instancesautos and maritime, for example-we were
hampered by Presidential campaign com-
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mitments. I found myself grudgingly admiring a sitting President who took his campaign oratory seriously.
The Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs
was a forum in which I presented analyses
of economic developments. Frequently, the
President and Vice President attended, and
my presentation would set off an informal
discussion on economic policy generally.
One Administration wag parodied a presentation of mine in the form of a fictitious
memo from "Murray Weidenbomber" (see
Exhibit A). I like to believe, however, that
my use of "economicese" was not quite as
arcane as this parody might lead one to
believe.
Meetings, of course, are the basis-and
bane-of a bureaucrat's existence. Surely, a
major part of the CEA chairman's time is
taken up by participating in meetings with
other Cabinet-level officials. An important
example is the Task Force on Regulatory
Relief, chaired by the Vice President.
Members of this group served as the chief
"honchos" of regulatory reform, overseeing
the operation of the executive order directing agencies to perform benefit/cost analysis
for proposed regulations and assigning important review responsibilities to OMB.
The Task Force also furnished an instance
of the need to establish personal priorities.
Regulatory relief, for me, was a labor of
love. As an academic, I had written on the
subject widely. My initial tie to the President was that body of work, which he had
drawn upon frequently in his radio broadcasts and columns as a private citizen. Also,
I had chaired the task force on regulation
during the campaign and the transition
period. At key points I was expected to, and
did, participate in setting regulatory policy.
Yet, I knew that if I participated on a day-to-

day basis, the time available for macroeconomic policy would suffer. Thus, I devotedas does almost every CEA chairman-most
of my time and efforts to macro matters.
For example, the CEA chairman-along
with the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Director of OMB-constitute the economic
"Troika." That informal group, which has
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Exhibit A
Memorandum for Cabinet Council on
Economic Affairs
From: Murray Weidenbomber
Date: April 19, 1982
Re: Economic Outlook-Balance of 1982
Banking figures show an easing of the
rate at which business is easing off. This
can be taken as ample proof of the government's contention that there's a slowing up
of the slowdown.
Now, to clarify that, it should be noted
that a slowing up of the slowdown is not as
good as an upturn of the downturn. On the
other hand, it's a good deal better than
either a speedup of the slowdown or a
deepening of the downturn. Also, it suggests
that the climate is about right for an adjustment of the re-adjustment to rate
structures.
Now, turning specifically to rates, we find
a very definite decreasing in the rate of increase. This clearly shows there should be a
letting up of the letdown. Of course, if the
slowdown should speed up, the decrease in
the rate of increase of rates would turn into
an increase in the rate of decrease.
And finally, the inflation of the recession
would turn the recession into a depression,
while a deflation in the rate of inflation
would give the impression of a recession of
the depression.

survived through many administrations,
typically meets weekly to review the economic outlook and the course of economic
policy. At times, the Troika meetings are expanded to include the President and/or
senior White House staff. On a few occasions, the chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board attended. George Shultz, when he
became Secretary of State, also attended
most meetings, and the Assistant to the
President for Domestic Affairs was a regular participant.
I found myself grudgingly admiri11g a sitti11g
President who took his campaign
oratory seriously

Briefing the President
Of course, the direct contacts with the
President are of very special importance.
Because I take the role of trusted advisor
seriously, there are some matters that I will
pass over. I do recall, however, discussing
the subject of gold with him on several occasions, a matter that he had studied at some
length. During the campaign and earlier, he
had indicated strong interest in restoring
the gold standard. As a member of the Gold
Commission (set up under a 1980 law), I told
him that I would pursue the matter with an
open mind. Subsequently, we reported that
the majority of the Commission opposed a
return to gold at this time. That disposed of
the matter. I see that episode as another example of the CEA's damage-limitation function or the avoidance of economic harm.

The Troika is the mechanism by which the
Administration's economic projections are
developed. At times, key budgetary and
economic policy changes go through informal mechanisms (such as that embodied in
the Troika and the senior White House staff)
rather than the formal Cabinet and Cabinet
Council organizations.
One administrative, yet strategic, set of
meetings is the daily gathering of the White
House senior staff, which the CEA chairman
regularly attends. This is an important communication device, providing a ready opportunity to raise issues and policy questions
and to push along specific matters. For example, an Administration position paper on
trade policy had been drafted at one point,
emphasizing a strong free trade orientation.
Although substantive agreement had been
reached by all relevant parties, the document itself was stuck in the Administration's
paperflow. My merely noting the delay led
to an on-the-spot decision to release this important document.

Another important function is to keep the
President abreast of current economic developments. In addition to sending out a regular flow of analytic reports, the CEA chairman alerts the President to impending releases of economic news. Thus, the evening
before the Consumer Price Index report for
a given month is issued, the President has
on his desk a memo from the CEA chairman
setting forth the highlights. At times he will
call for amplification. We had a pleasantbut spirited and extended-difference of
views on the matter of seasonally adjusted
versus unadjusted reports on employment
and unemployment. We ultimately resolved
this matter by my providing him both sets
of data, together with suitable caveats.
An insight into my approach to my job
related to that less-than-momentous issue.

10

II

"We do 1101 live in a seasonally
adjusted world"

After hearing me out fully, the President
decided that he would use the unadjusted
data in a speech. I then suggested a sentence
to explain his position: "We do not live in a
seasonally adjusted world." He promptly inserted it into his speech.
The Economic Report
The February 18, 1981, White Paper constituted the first major opportunity in the
Reagan Administration to put specific policies in a broader economic context, but it
was followed by many others. The most important, of course, is the annual Ec0110mic
Report of the President. The President's
message, written by the CEA, has for many
years been quite short. The great bulk of the
document is technically the Annual Report
of the Council of Economic Advisers. This is
a joint effort of the three members of the
Council and the entire staff of the Council.
The Annual Report also provides some opportunity to raise new issues and to move
policy along.
For example, it was widely known in
Washington that I had advocated making
some reductions in the rapidly expanding
military budget. This was a subject area in
which I had done research for over two
decades. As the first economist to raise
public concern about the inflationary impact of the Vietnam buildup, I believe I had
The 1982 Economic Report of the CEA raised
serious questio11s about the ec0110mic
feasibility of the Administratio11's
defense program

some credibility. Thus, the 1982 Economic
Report was, I believe, the first one that
raised serious questions about the economic
feasibility of the defense program of the Administration then in office.
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With regard to the annual Report, it is appropriate to mention the role of the CEA
staff. As is customary with a change in administration, I inherited the staff recruited
by my Democratic predecessor. Except for
career statisticians and secretaries, the staff
consisted of non-career appointees, most of
whom were on leave from their respective
universities. After a short period of adjustment, I found each and every one of them a
loyal and dedicated professional economist.
In fact, I asked several of them to stay on. In
any event, both the original CEA staff and
their replacements were, with very few exceptions, extremely helpful in carrying out
the disparate functions of the agency. I
relied very heavily on the two members of
the Council, but I would probably embarrass them if I embellished upon that.
If the Presidency is a bully pulpit, the CEA
chairmanship is a most elevated lectureship

The Elevated Lectureship
If the Presidency is a bully pulpit, the
CEA chairmanship is a most elevated lectureship. As I look back on my experiences
in that office, I find that I used the position
to develop four themes: (1} economic freedom is closely intertwined with personal
liberty, (2} business-government relations
should be characterized by less intervention
by government, (3) free trade is the international combination of these two themes, and
(4} it is necessary, from time to time, to take
a swipe at business' pleas for special privileges. Clearly, these four points are closely
connected.
Appropriately enough, I devoted my entire
address to the Freedoms Foundation at
Valley Forge on May 8, 1981, to the subject
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tion than without it. Any time the government resorts to regulation, we run the
risk that the market system will suffer
unintended, incremental damage as a sideeffect. The presumption should be in
favor of private decision-making. If we
cannot demonstrate that regulation will
lead to a superior outcome than the present state of affairs, we should refrain
from loading yet another requirement or
prohibition onto the American economic
system.
The international dimension of these concepts is that if you scratch an economist,
you will find a free trader. In a variety of
Congressional appearances and public
speeches, I presented the case for free trade,

of "Freedom and Economics." A key excerpt
follows:
When the frenetic events of the day are
evaluated in the more leisurely light of
history, I am confident that we will find
that we have been engaged in an effort far
more fundamental than raising the growth
rate of the real GNP or slowing the pace
of the Consumer Price Index, worthy as
these actions may be.
We are engaged in an unprecedented effort to shift the focus of decision-making
away from the Federal government and to
the many diverse and smaller organizations and institutions that better serve the
individual ... [This is] part of a larger task:
to reduce the power and obtrusiveness of
the Federal government in all of its many
dimensions.
I embellished on this theme in an interview a few months later:
I am fascinated by the fact that when
you take away the legal frontier between
the communist sector and the capitalistic
sector and you let people move, you can
predict the direction in which they will
move.
The CEA chairman has a national and at
times international audience. Early in the
Administration, in March 1981, I presented
a lecture to the Woodrow Wilson Center at
the Smithsonian Institution in which I
sketched out the economic justification for
a reduced governmental role in society. I
was pleased to see the very wide distribution of this speech-including reprints of
reprints-which resulted. Here is a typical
excerpt:
Resort to regulation should always be
the last step in dealing with a problem,
not the first or second. Further, before
regulating, we should be certain that the
world will be in better shape with regula-

The benefits of trade are nearly always
a two-way street. Competition, whether
domestic or international, fosters efficient
allocation of resources into relatively
more productive activities; better products, at lower prices, appear in the marketplace. Consumer choice is expanded;
inflationary pressures are reduced.
It is sad to report that the general support
of business executives for these free market
principles is far too often overwhelmed by
their advocacy of specific benefits to their
industry or company-always justified, of
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"Before regulating, we should be certain that
the world will be in better shape with regulacion tha11 without it .... The presumption
should be in favor of private
decision-making"
speaking in a language that at times seems
arcane to economists-plain English. My
testimony to a joint hearing of the Senate
Banking and Finance Committees on July 9,
1981, made that point:

course, on an "exceptions" basis. I raised
that point initially in a speech to the committee for Economic Development on May
21, 1981: "It is important to support, protect, and defend the private enterprise
system, and sometimes you have to do that
in face of the opposition of individual entrepreneurs." I subsequently spelled out my
response in "The Case Against Bailouts,"
delivered to the Pennsylvania Bankers Association on May 25, 1982. Here is a small portion of that speech:
Bailouts send the wrong signal because
they tell people-investors as well as
businessmen-that they do not have to
worry about investment risks and cost
overruns, that the Federal government
will always come to their rescue and
pump up their incomes by open or hidden
subsidies.

money and credit ... will restrain ... the
pressures for wage and price increases
that can't be supported by the market.
As a result, we will see in the years
ahead wage and price decisions which
have a much lower inflationary potential
than the actions we've seen in the past,
because the basic external environment in
which wages and prices are set is being
changed. That is, the inflationary environment is being wound down.
All in all, I have an upbeat feeling about
the state of economics. Although we often
read that economics is in disarray and that
economists are as predictably wrong as the
economy remains unpredictable, I for one
am not prepared to don sackcloth and ashes
and recite from the Book of Lamentations.

I prese11ted the case for free trade, speaki11g
i11 a language that at times seems arcmte to
ec0110mists-plai11 E11glish

Looki11g at the i11tellectual wreckage of recel1t years, I am impressed at how much
11011sense we have wtleamed and how many
old and more modest but harder truths have
been co11{irmed

The View from the Outside
For a teacher, the rewards of service to
the President were considerable, albeit
psychic. One give-and-take session on national television gave me the chance to explain aspects of the economy to a far large1·
audience than a college professor normally
can generate in a lifetime. Witness this excerpt from a session on Meet the Press on
August 30, 1981:
Question: You've talked about the importance of reducing inflation. How do
you think that your tight fiscal and money
policies feed through to fight inflation?
How do they affect wages and prices
throughout the economy?
Dr. Weide11baum: By setting in motion
basic factors, ... the slower availability of

Looking at the intellectual wreckage of recent years, I am impressed at how much
nonsense we have unlearned and how many
old and more modest but harder truths have
been confirmed.
Frankly, I find it a relief that so many
brave new theories-always bolstered or
perhaps obscured by weighty mathematical
dressing-have been discredited. My case in
point is supply-side economics, especially as
it was espoused in its most unequivocaland hence most widely reported-version:
cut tax rates and you simply and quickly unleash the latent strength of a dynamic economy. The sudden onrush of work, saving
and investment supposedly will generate
such new heights of production and income
that we will no longer have to worry about
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budget deficits. In fact, one of the "high
priests" contended that deficits would be
declining so rapidly that we would be able
to expand government spending simultaneously with the reductions in tax rates!
In retrospect, spouting that sort of nonsense was a lot of fun-especially on the
part of those who stayed on the sidelines
and carefully avoided taking the responsibilities of office. Thus, the important kernel of
truth in supply-side economics was submerged by a plethora of bombastic promises. The kernel of truth, of course, is the

The important kernel of truth in supplyside economics was submerged by a
plethora of bombastic promises.
substance of traditional, conservative economics-not startingly new, but vitally important. It may surprise those with short
memories that the concern with the adverse
effects of high tax rates and the need to encourage saving and investment were staples
of pre-Lafferite conservative economic
thought. These concerns were neither invented nor discovered on a cocktail napkin,
nor on the editorial pages of a daily newspaper.
But important economic concepts regarding taxation, savings, and investment were
embellished-and that is what made them,
at least for a while, so saleable. Alas, the instant cure was not forthcoming. But the
kernel of truth, the undramatic but fundamental underpinnings of modern conservative thought, are as pertinent as ever.
I returned to the private sector with no
grand l~ssons. I came away grateful for the
opportunity to speak my mind and to know
that decision makers in government were
listening to at least one economist before
making up their minds.
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Typical Washington Workday

7:45 a.m.-Meet with CEA staff director on
day's highlights and review today's newspaper coverage of the
Administration.
8:00 a.m.-Daily meeting of White House
senior staff. Announce morning
CPI release and answer questions on the economy.
8:45 a.m.-Semi-weekly meeting of Cabinet
Council on Economic Affairs
(President attending). Make
pre sen ta tion on economic
outlook. Answer questions on
forecasts and policy. Comment
on Treasury Department presentation on monetary policy.
9:50 a.m.-Car to Capitol Hill. Review likely
Congressional questions with
CEA staff economist.
10:00 a.m.-Testify on Administration's
economic policy before Senate
Banking Committee. Tape brief
remarks for TV.
11:50 a.m.-Car to next meeting. Return call
from White House.
12:00 p.m.-Address lunch meeting of National Convention of Savings and
Loan Associations. Hold impromptu press conference. Continue interview walking back to
office.
2:00 p.m.-Return urgent calls from press
and interest groups. Review and
sign key documents. Brief
meeting with representatives of
Hispanic groups.
3:00 p.m.-Make pre sen ta tion on Administration's economic policy
for delegation of local government officials at the White
House. The President makes a
brief appearance.
(colltillued
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4:00 p.m.-Meet at CEA with delegates of
real estate and housing industry
officials expressing concern over
high interest rates (at request of
Chairman of Senate Finance
Committee).
4:40 p.m.-Return urgent phone calls.
5:00 p.m.-Meet with Economic Minister of
West Germany.
5:30 p.m.-Review memo to President on
tomorrow's release on housing
starts. Call Regan, Stockman,
Volcker to alert them and
discuss implications.
6:00 p.m.-Chair meeting of Council of
Economic Advisers to review
work agenda and early planning
of Economic Report.
6:30 p.m.-Return remaining telephone
calls. Talk with CEA staff director on way to next meeting.
7:00 p.m.-Address dinner meeting of NAM
Board of Directors.
10:30 p.m.-Return to residence. Read cables
and papers for tomorrow's
meetings.
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